Application of Eisner v. Macomber to Pro Rata Stock Distributions in Payment of Salaries: an Opportunity for Tax Manipulation by unknown
APPLICATION OF EISNER v. MACOMBER TO PRO RATA
STOCK DISTRIBUTIONS IN PAYMENT OF SALARIES:
AN OPPORTUNITY FOR TAX MANIPULATION*
TiE Internal Revenue Code permits a taxpayer corporation to deduct from
its gross income reasonable compensation for services rendered to the cor-
poration.1 Under the accrual basis of accounting, this deduction is taken in
the year when the liability for salary accrues, even if no payment is made at
that time.2 A method of payment frequently employed is the transfer to the
employee of shares of stock in the corporation. 3 The recipient must report
as gross income the fair market value of the stock at the date of transfer.4
A cash basis employee reports income in the year of transfer,5 while an
accrual basis emplo),ee reports income in the year when his salary claim
against the corporation accrues.6
Under the rule of Eisner v. Macomber,7 applicable to distributions prior
*Deloss E. Daggitt, 23 T.C. No. 6 (Oct. 13, 1954).
1. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 23(a) (1.) (A), as amended, 56 STAT. 819 (1942) (now
INT. REv. CoDE oF 1954, § 162(a) (1)). For general criteria of reasonableness, see U.S.
Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.23(a)-6 (1953); Commercial Iron Works Co. v. Commissioner,
166 F.2d 221 (5th Cir. 1948). Compensation to officers or stockholders which bears a
dose relation to stock interests is carefully scrutinized. See U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 3923
(a)-6 (1953); J.J. Hart, Inc., 9 T.C. 135 (1947); Holmes & Janes, Inc., 30 B.T.A. 74
(1934).
See, generally, 1 MERTENS, FEDERAL INcOuE TAxATioN § 9.22 (1942).
2. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.43-1 (1953); Lucas v. Ox Fibre Brush Co., 281 U.S.
115 (1930). Income is determined in accordance with the taxpayer's accounting method
so long as this clearly reflects income. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 41, 53 STAT. 24 (now
INT. RE,. CoDE oF 1954, § 446). Corporations vill usually follow the accrual basis of
accounting because their transactions are many and complex. 2 CCH 1955 STAND. FEn.
TAx REP. 1 2820.027.
Year-end accruals of salaries and bonuses in years of large corporate incomes may
be disallowed to prevent tax manipulation. C.S. Ferry & Son, Inc., 18 B.T.A. 1261
(1930).
3. Cf. 1 CCH 1955 STAND. FED. TAx REn. 66.103. See, e.g., Indianapolis Glove
Co. v. United States, 96 F.2d 816 (7th Cir. 1938); United States Steel Corp., 2 T.C.
430 (1943). The corporation may deduct the fair market value of the stock, Package
Machinery Co., 28 B.T.A. 980 (1933), or the difference between the fair market value
of the stock and the employee's subscription price, United States Steel Corp., mspra.
Although a corporation's assets are not reduced by a distribution of its own stuck,
this stock has always been considered sufficient payment to permit a deduction, since
the corporation can always sell the stock and realize the fair market value. See opinions
in Commercial Investment Trust Corp., 28 B.T.A. 143 (1933).
4. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, §§ 39.22(a)-3, -1 (1953); Allen v. Commissioner, 107
F.2d 151 (4th Cir. 1939).
5. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.22(a)-3 (1953).
6. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.43-1 (1953).
7. 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
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to the 1954 Code,8 a stockholder receiving a distribution of shares of stock
in proportion to his holdings in the corporation realizes no taxable income
within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment.0 Such a stock dividend,
involving a transfer of corporate funds from undistributed surplus to capital, 10
does not result in a severance of income from the capital assets of the cor-
poration." And since it does not change the stockholder's "proportionate
interest" in the corporation, it does not increase the intrinsic value of his
holdings.' 2 Under the proportionate interest test stock distributions are tax-
able if they give the recipients a different interest in the corporation in terms
of dividend, voting, or liquidation rights.13 But it is clear that no income is
realized in cases like Eisner v. Macomber involving distributions of common
stock pro rata to existing holders of common stock. 14
The recent case of Deloss E. Daggitt 15 presented a unique situation in
which stockholders received a pro rata distribution of stock as payment for
services rendered to the corporation. Producers Transport, Inc., accrued in
December 1947, a $10,000 salary liability for services performed in that year
by its two principal stockholders, and deducted this expense from its 1947
income tax return.16 Of this amount, $9000 constituted the 1947 salary of
Daggitt, the president of the corporation, and $1000 constituted additional
compensation to Reid, its terminal manager 7 At the time these salaries
were voted, the stockholders agreed to accept payment in stock of the cor-
poration.' 8  In February 1948, Producers Transport settled the above lia-
bility account by authorizing and issuing to the employee-stockholders at par
value 1000 additional shares of $10 par common stock.19 Daggitt, holder of
90.84 per cent of the existing common stock, received 900 shares, while Reid,
holder of 9.08 per cent, received 100 shares. 20 The corporation debited the
8. For changes made by the 1954 Code, see text at note 37 infra.
9. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 219 (1920).
10. PAToN, ESSENTIALS OF AcCOUNTING 737-42 (rev. ed. 1949) ; BALLANTINE, CO-
PoRATIONs 481-85 (rev. ed. 1946).
11. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 210 (1920).
12. Id. at 211. Capitalization is the opposite of a realization, as the profits are placed
in the capital stock account and -no longer available for distribution. Ibid.
13. Koshland v. Helvering, 298 U.S. 441 (1936) (dividend of voting common on
non-voting preferred); Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U.S. 238 (1937) (dividend of pre-
ferred on common). See, generally, Lowndes, Taxation of Stock Dividends and Stock
Rights, 96 U. PA. L. Rav. 147 (1947).
14. Helvering v. Sprouse, 318 U.S. 604 (1943) (non-voting common on voting
common). For a general discussion of the limitations on Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S.
189 (1920), see MAGILL, TAXABLE INCoME 44-47, 58, 65-80 (rev. ed. 1945).
15. 23 T.C. No. 6 (Oct. 13, 1954).
16. Deloss E. Daggitt, 23 T.C. No. 6, at 2 (Oct. 13, 1954).
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid. The corporation's cash position was such that it could not make full payment
in cash. Ibid.
19. Id. at 2-3.
20. Id. at 1-3. There were also two qualifying shares of stock outstanding. Id. at 1.
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salaries payable account and credited the capital account, but did not capi-
talize surplus.21 Daggitt, deeming himself to be on the accrual basis, reported
his salary as part of his gross income for 1947.2 Reid, a cash basis tax-
payer, reported his additional compensation as income in 1948.23
The Commissioner determined deficiencies in the 1948 returns of both
employees, contending that upon receipt of the stock, Daggitt and Reid had
realized income to the extent of the fair market value of the stock-$58.75
per share2 4 The Tax Court held that the employees had received no con-
stitutional income, since their "proportionate interests" in the corporation
were "substantially" maintained by the stock distribution.2 Although it stated
that the distribution was not a stock dividend, presumably because there had
been no capitalization of surplus, the court found that Daggitt preinted a
situation "so close" to Eisner v. Macomber that it felt compelled to follow
that case.
26
The Tax Court could have reasoned that the stockholders constructively
received payment in cash of their salary claims,2 7 and simultaneously sub-
21. Brief for Respondent, p. 8, Deloss E. Daggitt, 23 T.C. No. 6 (Oct. 13, 1954).
See note 36 infra.
22. Deloss E. Daggitt, 23 T.C. No. 6, at 3 (Oct. 13, 1954).
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Id. at 3-4. The court held that the slight increase in Reid's proportionate in-
terest was de ninimis. Id. at 4.
Despite the fact that the shareholders received no income from the transaction, they
might have felt that their interests were more flexible with additional shares of stock.
Moreover, they might have had the psychological motive of receiving something tangible
for their services from a prosperous corporation which was investing its cash in capital
equipment. See Zang & Thompson, WVhy Stock Dzidends Are Declared, 27 T,,xEs
883, 885 (1949). But the shareholders could have achieved the same effect by means of
a stock split.
26. Deloss E. Daggitt, 23 T.C. No. 6, at 3 (Oct. 13, 1954). The Commissioner has
acquiesced in this decision. 4 P-H 1955 FED. TAx SEtv. ff 76743.
See also Benjamin Josephson, P-H 1947 T.C. Mem. Dec. fI 47186 (stock as payment
for accrued salaries to sole stockholder non-taxable under Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S.
189 (1920)).
27. I.T. 2277, V-1 Cuma. Bul.. 206 (1926) (officers' salaries credited by controlled
corporation to purchase of capital stock were constructively received by officers) ; J.R.
Holsey Sales Co., P-H 1945 T.C. Mem. Dec. ff 45163 (stockholder constructively re-
ceived income even though corporation's check paying for services was endorsed bac:
to corporation as capital contribution). Cf. James J. Cooney, 18 T.C. &33 (1952)
(bonuses authorized to principal stockholder-officers of controlled corporation were con-
structively received although not set aside on corporate books). liut ci. John Harvey
Kellogg, 2 T.C. 1126 (1943) (constructive receipt rejected where stockholder gratuitous-
ly forgave salaries).
In Commissioner v. Capento Securities Corp., 140 F.2d 382 (1st Cir. 1944), the court
held that substitution of stock for bonds in a reorganization amounted to a subscriptiun
for the stock in the amount of the bonded indebtedness. The bondholders must have
constructively received the amount of the debt in order to subscribe for the sto:k. But
cf. Claridge Apartments Co. v. Commissioner, 138 F2d 962 (7th Cir. 1943), rez"d on
other grounds, 323 U.S. 141. (1944).
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scribed pro rata for the equivalent par value of additional stock in the cor-
poration. 28 Daggitt and Reid considered that they had received income, since
they reported their salary claims. And Daggitt presented no problem of tax
avoidance, since the salaries deducted by the corporation were included by
its stockholders. 29  If the proportionate interests of the stockholders had
changed as a result of the salary accrual and stock distribution, the stock-
holders would have been taxable to the extent of the fair market value of the
stock distributed.30 But since the stockholders' interests in Daggitt remained
unchanged, Eisner v. Macomber would prevent their realization of any in-
come except the salary constructively received.8 '
28. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920), has no application to a pro rata stock
subscription. There is no possibility of gain or loss either to the stockholder or the cor-
poration from any form of stock subscription. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.22(a)-15
(195.3). The stockholder receives as his basis the subscription price of the stock. Estate
of L.W. Mallory, 27 B.T.A. 750 (1933). Under this theory, the basis in Daggilt would
have been the accrued salary claim reported as income and with which the stock sub-
scription at par value was made, see text at note 19 supra, although in the case of a
non-pro rata stock distribution in payment of salaries, the stockholder must report as
income and receives as basis the fair market value of the stock. Commissioner v. Van-
deveer, 114 F.2d 719 (6th Cir. 1940). In a pro rata stock dividend there is no basis for
the stock distributed but the old basis is allocated between the old and new stock. Int.
Rev. Code of 1939, § 113(a) (19), added by 53 STAT. 872 (1939) (now IT. R~v. Cor.
OF 1954, § 307). Since the Tax Court in Daggitt held that the stockholder-employees
received no constitutional income in 1948, they apparently had no basis for the stock
even though they reported the salaries as income. Although Reid might be able under
Daggitt to reopen his 1948 return in order to get a refund of the tax paid on his reported
salary, Daggitt would not have this remedy because he accrued his salary in 1947. The
stock subscription theory should be applied to prevent such an inequity.
In Joy Mfg. Co., 23 T.C. No. 137 (March 31, 1955), the Tax Court adopted a stock
subscription theory, holding neither Daggitt nor Macomber applicable where a corporation
agreed to receive stock of its wholly owned subsidiary as payment of past and future
engineering fees. Although the court put stress on the parent's accrual method of accounting
in holding the fees to be taxable income, the case is mainly distinguishable from Daggitt
in the Government's argument for taxing the fees rather than the stock. The stock sub-
scription rationale of Joy should not be limited to accrual basis recipients. See note 27 supra.
29. See text at notes 16-23 supra. For possibilities of avoidance in future cases, see
text at notes 41-43 bnfra.
30. Commissioner v. Vandeveer, 114 F.2d 719 (6th Cir. 1940). See also note 4
supra and accompanying text.
31. See note 28 supra and text at notes 7-14 supra.
In the Daggitt case no move was made to reopen the 1947 return of Producers
Transport, Inc., perhaps because the Commissioner considered that a stock subscription
was involved and therefore no gain or loss recognized. See Letter from William 11.
Quealy, Esq., Counsel for Petitioners, to the Yale Law Journal, March 8, 1955, on file in
Yale Law Library. However, it should be realized that if the amount of the obligation
cancelled exceeds the amount used to subscribe for the stock, there may be income to
the corporation on the cancellation of indebtedness. Commissioner v. Vandeveer, supra
note 30, at 722-23. See text at note 53 in ra.
The court could also have held that the majority stockholder, Daggitt, received all the
stock and then made a gift of 100 shares to the minority stockholder, Reid, as the intention
in giving Reid his additional compensation was primarily to keep his interest the same,
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The Tax Court, however, held that Eimer v. Macombcr prevented reali-
zation of any income, even though the stock was distributed in payment of
accrued salaries rather than as a dividend.32 If this view had been correct,
the court could also have applied section 115(f) (1) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1939 exempting from taxation any corporate "distribution" of its
stock to the extent that this does not "constitute income to the shareholder"
under the Sixteenth Amendment.33 Although stock dividends generally in-
volve capitalization of surplus,34 115(f)(1)'s exemption of constitutionally-
exempt dividends seems broad enough to include the distribution in Dag-
gitt.3 5 Moreover, since the par value of the stock issued was equal to the
salaries payable account cancelled, the stock distribution represented surplus
made available by the salary cancellation despite the failure of Producers
Transport to make a formal capitalization of surplus. 0
Section 305 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 grants tax exemp-
tion to "any distribution made by a corporation to its shareholders, with
respect to the stock of such corporation," in stock of the corporation, even
when this disturbs the proportional interest of existing shareholders.37
Since the phrase "with respect to the stock of such corporation" was intended
rather than to pay compensation. Deloss E. Daggitt, 23 T.C. No. 6, at 2 (Oct. 13, 1954).
See Jacksonville Paper Co., P-H 1954 T.C. MIE.m. DEc. ff 54223. See, also, note 69 ihira.
On this theory Daggitt would pay tax on the fair market value of the 10 shares, as his
proportionate interest was changed, and then pay a gift tax on the 100 shares given to Reid.
A third alternative would have been to hold that because the stockholders agreed at
the time their salaries were voted to accept payment by a non-taxable stock distribution,
see text at notes 16-19 and 25 supra, no salaries should have been deducted by the cor-
poration or reported as income by the stockholders. See note 52 infIra. Cf. Natural Gaso-
line Corp. v. Commissioner, 219 F.2d 682 (10th Cir. 1955).
32. See text at notes 25-26 supra.
33. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 115(f) (1), 53 STAT. 47. Section 115(f) (1) vas adopted
in the Revenue Act of 1936, § 115(f) (1), 49 STAT. 168, and was interpreted by the
Supreme Court as making the pre-1936 stock dividend exemptions, including Eisner v.
Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920), exempt by statute. Helvering v. Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371
(1943).
34. See note 10 .spra and accompanying text.
35. Although dividends occur only to the extent of current or accrued earnings and
profits, Int. Rev. Code of 1939, §§ 115(a), (b), as amended, 61 STAT. 179 (1947), S6
STAT. 896 (1942) (now IT. Rv. CODE oF 1954, § 316), earnings and profits are not
necessary for § 115 (f) (1) stock distributions as these are not considered dividends under
the code. See U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.115(a)-i(c) (1953).
36. The usual accounting procedure for the Daggilt transaction would have been
to debit salaries payable and credit surplus and simultaneously to debit surplus and credit the
capital stock account. In Daggitt no book entries were made affecting the surplus account,
see note 21 supra and accompanying text, but the effect on the surplus of the corporation
was identical.
Regarding the weight to be given to a corporation's accounting procedure in failing
to make any capitalization in the course of stock distributions, conspare Bass v. Com-
missioner, 129 F.2d 300 (1st Cir. 1942), with Adam A. Adams, 5 T.C. 351 (1945)L
37. IN T. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 305(a). See H.R. REp. No. 1337, ISd Cong., 2d
Sess. A81 (1954); S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 240-42 (1954).
1955]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
to make clear that this section exempted any distribution to stockholders by
reason of their rights as "holders" of existing stock, it may mean that the
section does not exempt a pro rata distribution to employees for accrued
salaries.3 Moreover, where a stock distribution "has the effect of the pay-
ment of compensation" for services rendered to the corporation, section
305(c)(3) refers to section 61(a)(1), which includes such compensation
within gross income. 9 Although this cross reference has no legislative history
and is intended to have no legal effect,40 it suggests a continuing congres-
sional intent to tax stock distributions received as compensation. Congress
apparently did not consider in 305(c) (3) the effect of pro rata stock dis-
tributions to employees. But, under the Tax Court's theory, Eisner v.
Macomber would impose a constitutional prohibition against taxing these
distributions, despite any attempt in the 1954 Code to subject them to tax-
ation.
The Tax Court holding that the stockholder-employees in Daggitt received
no taxable income indicates the possibility of substantial tax advantages for
corporations which consider their stockholders as employees for the purpose
of salary deductions but as investors for the purpose of stock distributions.
Producers Transport eliminated the $10,000 liability for accrued salaries by
means of its stock distribution in 1948 without any diminution of assets.4 1 It
still retained full control of the amount which it added to its capital account. 42
Yet the corporation's taxable income for 1947 was reduced by the amount of
the deduction for accrued salaries payable, thereby resulting in a tax saving
of approximately $5700.43 And under the Tax Court holding, cash basis
employees would not be obligated to report the salaries or stock distribution
as income.44 Therefore a tax advantage is inherent under Daggiltt unless the
Commissioner can either disallow the corporation's salary deduction or find
a realization of income by the corporation when the liability for salaries is
eliminated by the stock distribution.
The principal weapon to prevent the salary deduction is section 24(c) of
38. H.R. RaP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A81 (1954). This phrase was intended
to exempt even stock distributions involving redemption or surrender of other stock.
Ibid. Although the Senate made many changes in § 305 of the House bill, see S. REI'.
No. 1622, 83d Cong., _d Sess. 240-42 (1954), it neither changed nor commented upon
this House provision.
39. INT. Rrv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 305(c) (3), 61 (a) (1).
40. I-NT. R .. CODE OF 1954, § 7806.
41. See text at note 19 supra.
42. BALLANTINE, Co uoPATioNs 482-83 (rev. ed. 1946); see note 12 supra.
43. In 1947 Producers Transport, Inc., had $34,071,39 of operating income before
deducting the accrued salaries. Deloss E. Daggitt, 23 T.C. No. 6, at 2 (1954). The
large tax saving was due to the jump in rates for corporate incomes above $25,000. Int. Rev.
Code of 1939, §§ 13, 15, as amended, 56 STAT. 805 (1942), 59 STAT. 568 (1945). The
1954 Code similarly has a jump in the corporate tax rate at $25,000. INT. Rav. CODV
OF 1954, § 11.
44. See text at notes 24-26 supra.
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the 1939 Code, now section 267(a) (2) of the 1954 Code. 5 This section
prohibits a corporation from deducting expenses, including salaries, accrued
to a stockholder who directly or indirectly owns more than fifty per cent in
value of the stock of the corporation,4" if these expenses are not "paid" dur-
ing the corporation's taxable year or 2Y2 months thereafter, and if they are
not "includible" within the same period in the gross income of the stock-
holder.47
If the ninety per cent stockholder in Daggitt had been on the cash basis,
the pro rata stock distribution would never have been includible in his gross
income, because it did not constitute income.4 8 Therefore the salary would
only be deductible if the stock distribution constituted payment. The cases
construing section 24(c) have indicated that a liability is not "paid" by a
debtor corporation unless it produces taxable income to the creditor. 4 Any
other interpretation would contravene the policy of 24(c) : to produce uni-
formity among related taxpayers, by preventing a corporate deduction with-
out an accompanying inclusion of the same amount by the controlling stock-
holder.5 0 It therefore seems clear that corporate distribution of stock pro rata
will not permit a salary deduction under 24(c).
45. Int Rev. Code of 1939, § 24(c), as amended, 67 STAT. 617 (1953) (now I:NT.
Rtv. CoDE OF 1954, § 267(a) (2)).
46. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 24(c) (3), 53 STAT. 17 (now I,,T. REv. CODE OF 1954,
§ 267(a) (2) (B)).
47. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 24(c)(1), as amended, 67 STAT. 617 (1953) (now
IT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 267(a) (2) (A)).
48. See text at notes 25 and 32 snpra. As Daggitt was on the accrual basis, his
salary was includible in the year when his claim accrued. See text at note 52 infra.
49. Musselman Hub-Brake Co. v. Commissioner, 139 F.2d 65 (6th Cir. 1943);
Michael Flynn Mfg. Co., 3 T.C. 932 (1944).
Prior to the 1953 amendment of 24(c) providing that a corporation could deduct
expenses if "includible" within the specified period in the gross income of the related
taxpayer, see note 47 supra and accompanying te-t, the principal problem concerning
24(c) was whether "payment" encompassed "constructive payment" so as to permit de-
duction of accruals to related taxpayers. Compare P.G. Lake, Inc. v. Commissioner,
148 F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1945) (no payment of accrued interest set aside on books of
corporation controlled by taxpayer having power to draw checks), with Anthony P.
Miller, Inc. v. Commissioner, 164 F.2d 268 (3d Cir. 1947) (constructive payment of
salary made by transfer of negotiable demand promissory notes, since recipient was
obligated to report the notes as income). See Kaplan, Confusion in 24(c), 25 TAxEs
152 (1947).
The 1953 amendment of § 24(c) (1), 67 STAT. 617, provides that either payment by
the corporation or receipt by the related taxpayer within the taxable year of the cor-
poration and two and one-half months is sufficient to allow the deduction.
50. Section 24(c) was enacted to prevent a corporation and its controlling stwck-
holders from advantageously selecting different years for the deduction and inclusitn
of the same item of compensation. See Paul, Some Problns Under the %7c-, Section
24(c), 32 TmxEs 191 (1954); LR. Res'. No. 1546, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1937).
However, its purpose would be equally applicable where the stockholder never was re-
quired to include the compensation as income. See H.R. ReP., op. cit. supra.
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Section 24(c), however, is wholly inapplicable to a person, such as Reid,
owning fifty per cent or less of the corporate stock,r' even though as a cash
basis taxpayer he may never report his salary as income. Moreover, the
policy of the section is satisfied in the case of an accrual basis stockholder,
such as Daggitt, since the salary deducted by the corporation is includible
within his gross income regardless of whether he receives payment5 2 In both
of these situations, the corporation can deduct reasonable compensation for
stockholders.
The unwarranted tax advantages made possible by Daggitt would be elimi-
nated if the corporation were held to realize income upon elimination of the salary
liability. When a debt is settled for less than its face value, the debtor normally
must report as taxable income the difference between the amount of the
obligation and the amount of the settlement.53 But a discharge of indebted-
ness may be considered as a gift and not taxable to the debtor if the intent
of the creditor was to forgive all or part of the claim without consideration,"4
rather than to get the "best price available" from the debtor.r
A Treasury Regulation provides that when a shareholder in a corporation
which is indebted to him "gratuitously forgives the debt" the transaction
51. See text at note 46 supra.
52. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 24(c) (2), 53 STAT. 17 (now INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,
§ 267(a)(2)(B)). However, since there was an intent at the time the salary was
accrued to "pay" the salary with a non-taxable stock distribution, see Deloss E. Dag-
gitt, 23 T.C. No. 6, at 2 (Oct. 13, 1954), it might be argued that the salary was not
includible as income to the controlling stockholder, as he never should have accrued
anything.
53. United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1 (1931); Helvering v. Edison
Bros. Stores, Inc., 133 F.2d 575 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 752 (1943); U.S.
Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.22(a)-13 (1953). However, if the debtor is insolvent, he receives
no taxable income except the amount by which his assets exceed his liabilities as a
result of the settlement. Texas Gas Distributing Co., 3 T.C. 57 (1944).
The debtor corporation has the option of reducing the basis of its property by the
amount of the forgiveness, instead of reporting this amount as income, Int. Rev. Code
of 1939, § 22(b) (9), as amended, 64 STAT. 927 (1.950) (now INT. Rav. CoE o" 1954,
§ 108(a)).
54. Helvering v. American Dental Co., 318 U.S. 322 (1942) (settlement of accrued
rent and interest on notes resulted in gratuitous forgiveness regardless of creditor's in-
tent, since creditor received no consideration for the amount cancelled). A "gift" is not
included within gross income. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 22(b) (3), as amended, 56 STAT.
809 (1942) (now INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 102(a)). However, "gift" may be exempt
from the income tax provisions without there being sufficient donative intent to subject
the transfer to the gift tax. Holzman, Tax Classics: American Dental, 27 TAXES 379,
381 (1949).
55. See Commissioner v. Jacobson, 336 U.S. 28 (1949), where a debtor's purchase
of bonds for less than face value resulted in income, since the bondholders bargained
for the settlement and did not intend to release their claims as a gift. Jacobson's re-
quirement of donative intent had the effect of overruling the mechanical forgiveness
test laid down in American Dental, supra note 54. See Wright, Realizalion of Income
Through Cancellations, Modifications and Bargain Purchases of Indebtedness, 49 Micu.
L. REV. 459, 474-77 (1951).
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usually results in a "contribution to the capital of the corporation to the
extent of the principal of the debt."r6  Although this might imply that
forgiveness of a non-principal indebtedness produces income to the corpora-
tion, some courts have interpreted the regulation to mean that a stockholder's
gratuitous cancellation of any corporate debt owed him, including accrued
salaries and interest, results in no income.r But the Eighth Circuit, in Hel-
vening v. Jane Holding Corp., s noting the prior saving by the corporation
when these expenses were deducted, considered the regulation applicable only
to the forgiveness of "principal" indebtedness such as loans to the corpora-
tion, where there had been no previous tax benefit." It held that the dis-
charge by the sole stockholder of a claim for accrued interest on a loan re-
sulted in income to the corporation. 0
"Principal" as used in the regulation apparently refers to the principal
amount of a debt, as differentiated from interest, and does not seem to dis-
tinguish between deductible and non-deductible debts.0' However, the tax
56. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.22(a)-13 (1953). Since a contribution to capital
results from any forgiveness of indebtedness by a shareholder, Commissioner v. Nran-
deveer, 114 F.2d 719 (6th Cir. 1940), the regulation merely indicates that a gratuitous
forgiveness of a principal debt does not produce income. Even if the forgiveness is a
contribution to capital, its basis may be zero if the creditor never valued his claim fur
income tax purposes. George Hall Corp. v. Shaughnessy, 67 F. Supp. 748 (N.D.X.Y.
1946) ; Brazoria Investment Corp., 20 T.C. 690 (1953). Of course, unless a cancellation
of indebtedness is involved, a contribution to capital results in no income to the cor-
poration. See note 28 supra.
If the forgiveness is a contribution to capital, the transaction will usually not be
considered a gift unless the capital contributions are not proportionate to sharehuldings.
See Dunham, How to Eliminate the Tax on Debt Cancellation, 29 T%xEs 1.77, 129-31
(1951). See also note 54 supra and note 65 infra.
See, generally, Lebowitz, Forgveness of a Debt Owed to a Shareholder-Crcditor, 27
TAXES 897 (1947).
57. Commissioner v. Auto Strop Safety Razor Co., 74 F.2d 226 (2d Cir. 1934)
(royalties, loans, interest); Carroll-McCreary Co. v. Commissioner, 124 F.2d 303 (2d
Cir. 1941) (salaries). Although these cases stated that the debtor's tax advantages from
the prior deduction of the cancelled debts were immaterial, they were decided on facts
occurring prior to the change in the regulation adding "to the extent of the principal
of the debt." See text at note 56 supra.
58. 109 F.2d 933 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 653 (1940).
59. Helvering v. Jane Holding Corp., 109 F.2d 933, 939 (Sth Cir.), cert. dcnkcd,
310 U.S. 653 (1940). The facts in Jane also occurred prior to the change in the
regulation. See note 57 supra.
60. Helvering v. Jane Holding Corp., 109 F.2d 933, 944 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
310 U.S. 653 (1940). Jane was undercut by the Supreme Court's decision in American
Dental which impliedly rejected the tax benefit doctrine. Helvering v. American Dental
Co., 318 U.S. 322, 328 (1942). However, the limitation of American Dental by Com-
missioner v. Jacobson, 336 U.S. 28 (1949), apparently renews the force of Jane. See
note 55 supra. For support of Jane see Warren & Sugarman, Cancellation of In-
debtedness and Its Tax Consequences, 40 CoLum. L. RM,. 1326, 1359-61 (1940).
61. See Helvering v. Jane Holding Corp., 109 F.2d 933, 939 n.1 (8th Cir. 194u.
See also Wright, supra note 55, at 468 n.l.
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benefit to the corporation from the deduction of the principal amount of a
salary debt is identical to that resulting from deduction of interest. There-
fore the cases extending the Jane rationale to a stockholder's forgiveness of
a salary claim seem justified.
6 2
Despite the possible limiting effect of the regulation, forgiveness of even
a salary claim may not produce income to the corporation if a stockholder's
intent in fact is to make a gift. 63 Donative intent might seem particularly
clear in a case such as Daggitt where the controlling stockholders received
no consideration for cancellation of their salary claims, since, under the Tax
Court reasoning, the stock distribution did not result in any income to them."'
Yet where all the shareholders of a corporation participate in a proportionate
forgiveness of these accrued corporate liabilities, it seems unreasonable to
conclude that they are making gifts, because the "forgiveness" merely increases
the value of their proportionate interests in their own corporation. 5 Even if
the controlled corporation is regarded as an entity distinct from its stock-
holders, both the tax benefit resulting from the prior deduction of the salary
claims and the improved capital position of the corporation resulting from
the debt cancellation provide sufficient consideration for the forgiveness.10
Proportionate forgiveness of accrued salaries should therefore result in in-
come to the corporation to the extent of the deduction previously taken in the
year of salary accrual.
The stock distribution in Daggitt provides an opportunity for the Com-
missioner to find a realization of income to the corporation by the discharge
of indebtedness. However, if the stockholders were willing to forego pay-
ment of salaries and the corporation did not need to obtain a forgiveness of
the salary claims, the corporation over a substantial period of years could
deduct sums designated as compensation but actually intended merely to re-
62. See, e.g., Amsco-Wire Products Corp., 44 B.T.A. 717 (1941); Beacon Auto
Stores, Inc., 42 B.T.A. 703 (1.940).
63. See Commissioner v. Jacobson, 336 U.S. 28, 50 (1949).
64. See text at note 25 supra.
65. Compare Robert H. Scanlon, 42 B.T.A. 997 (1940) (transfer of stock to cor-
poration by sole stockholder not subject to gift tax), with Frank B. Thompson, 42
B.T.A. 121 (1940) (transfer of stock to corporation by one of controlling shareholders
subject to gift tax). See Dunham, supra note 56. See also notes 54 and 56 supra.
66. Cf. Helvering v. Jane Holding Corp., 109 F.2d 933 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
310 U.S. 653 (1940) (improvement of corporation's asset position sufficient considera-
tion); Howard Paper Co., 43 B.T.A. 545 (1941) (same). But cf. Commissioner v.
Auto Strop Safety Razor Co., 74 F.2d 226 (2d Cir. 1934) (improved capital position
of corporation indicates.capital contribution rather than income). But see note 56 supra.
The above criteria for finding consideration in cases involving pro rata forgiveness
where non-taxable stock is received seem equally applicable to cases in which a con-
trolling shareholder forgives a debt without receiving anything in return, since the
corporation is his instrumentality. However, if a small shareholder forgives a debt, it is
more likely that such a forgiveness is gratuitous since the benefits to the corporation




duce the corporation's tax liability. 67 But many closely-held corporations may
need to obtain additional capital by means of loans, and will have to arrange
some transaction eliminating this liability in order to improve their credit
position.68 Moreover, the Commissioner may disallow these accruals on the
theory that a corporation may deduct reasonable amounts for compensation
only if it actually intends to pay them.69 If the Commissioner cannot deter-
mine the true nature of any salary transaction between the corporation and
its controlling stockholders, Daggitt may point the way to tax manipulation
by means of the corporate personality.
67. See, e.g., Beacon Auto Stores, Inc., 42 B.T.A. 703 (1941). Since most em-
ployees would be on the cash basis, they would never report this as income. But if the
stockholder-employee owned more than fifty per cent of the stock of the corporation and
was not on the accrual basis, section 24(c) would prohibit the salary deduction. See text
at notes 48-51 supra.
68. See, e.g., Midland Tailors, P-H 1943 T.C. Mern. Dec. ff 43292; Tanner Mfg.
Co., P-H 1943 T.C. Mera. Dec. ff 43299. Before cancelling his claim, the stockholder
will probably try to achieve the same results by subordinating it. See Midland Tailors,
supra.
69. Beacon Auto Stores, Inc., 42 B.T.A. 703 (1941); Holmes & Janes, Inc., 30
B.T.A. 74 (1934). In Jacksonville Paper Co., P-H 1954 T.C. Mem. Dem. " 5423, stock
issued by a close corporation as payment for accrued salaries v.,as redistributed by the
stockholders in proportion to their holdings. The substantial part of the salary deduc-
tion was disallowed not because the salaries were unreasonable, but because the cor-
poration never intended to pay the salaries as accrued. Cf. Baldwin Bros. Co., P-H
1945 T.C. Mfem. Dec. ff 45262, aff'd, 157 F.2d 517 (6th Cir. 1946), in which salaries
were held unreasonable because the corporation was not in a position to pay such
salaries. Also cf. Regensburg v. Commissioner, 144 F2d 41 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323
U.S. 783 (1944), in which the court held that "loans" received by stockholders from
their corporation were in fact dividends, noting the large amount of the loans in com-
parison to the assets of the corporation.
The Commissioner has also succeeded in having the debtor report as income the
amount of obligations on which the statute of limitations has run. Securities Co. v.
United States, 85 F. Supp. 532 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). Cf. R. O'Dell & Sons Co. v. Com-
missioner, 169 F.2d 247 (3d Cir. 1948). Although these cases were based on a can-
cellation of indebtedness doctrine, they amount to a declaration by the courts that there
no longer is an intent by the debtor to pay his creditors.
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